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the development of sensory-motor thought among monkeys, go-
rillas, and humans. All three species achieve the six stages of this
development in the same sequence, with monkeys slower than go-
rillas, who are in turn slower than humans. Despite the fact that
Piaget’s theory is cited, B&R do not follow a developmental ap-
proach to understanding imitation. Given that monkeys and apes
mirror the human stages in sensory-motor thought, parallels in im-
itation, including the timing of its hierarchical nature, should be
observed.
One of the essential points of B&R’s analysis is that the action
and program levels of imitation are not on a continuum, but form
“two discrete categories, with little sign of intermediates at pres-
ent” (sect. 3, para. 4). Earlier in the target article they allude to the
distinction between Piaget’s (1945/1962) Stages 1 through 5 on
the one hand and Stage 6 on the other. These two categories cor-
respond, in a crude way, to the action and program levels of imi-
tation, respectively. However, a detailed reading of Piaget indi-
cates that there is a continuum between the action and program
levels of imitation and that this continuum hinges on the underly-
ing processes mediating cognitive growth.
Let us now turn to Piaget’s (1945/1962) theory and relate it to
B&R’s model. Piaget asserts that in Stage 1 the newborn starts life
with inborn reflexes as its initial schemas, assimilation and ac-
commodation processes that can modify these schemas, and the
capacity to have these reflexes triggered by a variety of external
stimuli. True imitation is absent in this stage; for example, crying
triggered by the crying of other babies is not imitation.
In Stage 2, an additional capacity emerges: primary circular re-
actions. These are essentially self-imitative acts in which infants
are able to repeat actions they have just performed. In this stage,
children can imitate others provided they have previously pro-
duced the activity through their own circular reactions. These are
action-level imitations and should be observed in apes, despite
B&R’s caveat that “to be sure of imitation, the act should not al-
ready be part of the animal’s repertoire” (sect. 1.5, para. 2).
In Stage 3, another new capacity emerges: secondary circular
reactions. These allow two sensory systems such as vision and
touch to be coordinated. This leads to the infant’s ability to repeat
actions that produce desired effects in the environment; for ex-
ample, kicking its feet on the bed, which moves a hanging mobile.
Imitation in this stage is restricted to movements the child has pre-
viously made and seen, and hence are at the action level. Children
cannot defer imitation at this stage because they do not have the
capacity for representation.
In Stage 4, yet another new capacity emerges: mobile indices.
These are not mental representations or signals, but rather be-
haviors that children can perform to mediate between perceived
movements of others and their own imitative behavior. For exam-
ple, in imitating its father sticking out his tongue, the infant bites
its lips (a mobile index) and then sticks out its tongue. The index
is mobile in the sense that it can be used to mediate a variety of
actions. Mobile indices allow the child to imitate actions it has al-
ready made, but unlike the actions in Stage 3, they are not visible
to the infant; for example, sticking out the tongue or opening and
closing the mouth. Thus, action-level imitation has moved to a
new level of complexity, but is still restricted to behaviors that are
already in the child’s repertoire.
In Stage 5, the child can now imitate models performing novel
actions, including those not visible to it. The new capacity of ter-
tiary circular reactions emerges at this stage. These allow the child
to experiment actively in the environment by repeating self-
initiated behaviors to see what results. These tertiary circular
reactions allow the child to imitate novel actions “through sys-
tematic and controlled trial and error.” Thus, Stage 5 is a bridge
between action and program levels of imitation.
In Stage 6, the child has acquired the capacity to form repre-
sentations, or mental images. This allows it to form images of the
actions of a model, store them, and defer imitation to a later time,
well after the model’s action has been performed. In a sense, the
child can now imitate the model internally and defer external im-
itation to a more suitable time or place. In addition, imitation can
now occur for more complex actions than seen in Stage 5. This
stage corresponds to the program level of imitation.
The next period of development is “representative intelli-
gence,” which occurs from ages 2 to 7 years, and in which images
and symbolic functions play the major roles in imitation. Children
become less concerned with attempting to match the details of
models, but focus more on the overall pattern of the actions. B&R
present data that suggest that the great apes can imitate at this
level of complexity.
In summary, a Piagetian developmental approach enlarges our
view of imitation in apes. It points to research that can be per-
formed to determine whether the same developmental processes
are involved with humans and apes. This research should demon-
strate with apes that there are intermediate states between the ac-
tion and program levels of imitation.
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Byrne & Russon’s (B&R’s) imaginative target article contains both
splitting and lumping proposals. The recommendation that imita-
tive social learning should be split into two varieties (action-level
and program-level imitation) has significant weaknesses, not the
least of which is its complete lack of empirical support. The data
reported by B&R only illustrate the claim that imitation can occur
at a hierarchical program level and could be interpreted in various
other ways. The mere fact that B&R can describe behaviour in
terms of goals and subgoals is not evidence that the behaviour was
executed under hierarchical control.
In our commentary, we will concentrate on the suggestion that
stimulus enhancement, emulation, and response facilitation
should be lumped together as instances of priming. There are
three problems with this proposal: it conceals important questions
about nonimitative social learning, it fails to forge useful links be-
tween this kind of learning and the cognitive psychological litera-
ture on priming, and it leaves unexplained the most interesting
feature of phenomena ascribed to “response facilitation.”
The first problem arises from the idiosyncratic way in which
B&R characterise stimulus enhancement. They describe stimulus
enhancement as if it were an associative phenomenon, in which a
conditioned stimulus (CS; e.g., a location) acquires excitatory
strength as a result of being observed in conjunction with an un-
conditioned stimulus (US; e.g., a conspecific eating). This is odd
because, ever since Spence (1937) coined the term stimulus en-
hancement, it has been treated as a variety of single stimulus learn-
ing in which conspecific behaviour draws the observer’s attention
to a stimulus, but does not act as a reinforcer. Observational con-
ditioning (Mineka et al. 1984) is the term traditionally used for
learning that is thought to depend on socially mediated exposure
to a CS–US relationship. Of course, B&R may use terms in what-
ever way they please, but putting the label stimulus enhancement
on observational conditioning is likely to cause confusion among
those familiar with the terms and to conceal important outstand-
ing questions about social learning. The conventional distinction
between stimulus enhancement and observational conditioning
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amounts to an untested hypothesis that conspecific observation
can attract an animal to an object via associative and nonassocia-
tive routes. By drawing attention to the role of Pavlovian mecha-
nisms in social learning, the term observational conditioning also
raises the largely unexplored possibility that animals can learn in-
hibitory as well as excitatory relationships by observation (Heyes
1994).
The second problem arises from inconsistencies between the
mechanism proposed to account for nonimitative social learning
and the cognitive psychological literature on priming. According
to B&R’s priming account, an internal representation will be
primed only if activated while a conspecific is seen to receive a re-
ward. In contrast, neither of the main types of priming phenom-
ena manipulated by cognitive psychologists require reward pre-
sentation. Under certain conditions, mere preexposure to a
priming item can result in either short-term facilitation of re-
sponses appropriate to a different probe item (associative prim-
ing) or relatively long lasting facilitation of responses to the same
probe item (repetition priming). Furthermore, the assumption
that only familiar items may be primed is inconsistent with exper-
iments indicating that priming can involve novel items (Squire
1992). This evidence undermines the only original prediction gen-
erated by B&R’s account of nonimitative effects, implying instead
that putative observational priming effects could produce novel
behaviours. The observational priming proposal does not harness
the explanatory power of cognitive psychology to make useful pre-
dictions about nonimitative social learning.
The third problem is that the observational priming proposal
does not adequately explain several experimental effects cate-
gorised by B&R as “response facilitation.” They suggest that be-
havioural concordance occurred in these experiments because the
observation of a conspecific making a response primed an inter-
nal representation mediating the execution of a matching re-
sponse. This proposal, however, has overlooked the most interest-
ing aspect of these effects: the information about a response
available to the experimental animals during observation differed
in important respects from that available to them during later ex-
ecution of the same response.
One respect in which observed and executed responses differ is
the availability of proprioceptive information. It is unlikely that re-
sponse representations code only the visual appearance of a re-
sponse (and not also proprioceptive information), yet the obser-
vational priming proposal does not provide a mechanism through
which the visual information available through observation of be-
haviour could prime response representations. A demonstration
of cross-modal priming in animals would be striking because such
effects do not occur equally across all sensory modalities even in
adult humans (Driver & Baylis 1993).
Visual information provided by observed and executed re-
sponses also differs because of the disparate viewpoints of per-
former and onlooker. This is easily illustrated using the example
of rats tested with the bidirectional control procedure (e.g., Heyes
et al. 1992). These animals encounter a conspecific face-to-face
while exposed to demonstrations of lateral responses. Hence a rat
reproducing, for example, a left response, is presented with reti-
nal images of its own limb movements (left translation) that are
radically different from those of the limb movements of its
demonstrator (right translation). Although these experiments
have limitations as tests of imitation (Gardner 1997), observational
priming clearly does not adequately explain behavioural concor-
dance in our rats. Priming is even unlikely to occur when observer-
demonstrator differences in viewpoints are less marked. Visual
repetition priming effects are strongly influenced by the specific
appearance of the priming stimulus (Squire 1992).
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